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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 












NATURE OF THE CASE 
Civil No. 18034 
Appellant has proceeded against Respondent requesting, 
inter alia, preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining and 
prohibiting Respondent from continuing employment with MetroData, a 
non-Utah corporation, or providing services to MetroData in connec-
tion with the design, development, manufacture, display, exhibition, 
sale or other promotion of the competing products of MetroData. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, Dee, Judge, denied 
Appellant's Motion for preliminary injunction. 
RELIEF' SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's Order denying 
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Appellant's Motion. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and MetroData compete with each other in the 
manufacture and sale to the cable television industry of sophisti-
cated equipment known as character generators. (Transcript at 7-11, 
15, 30; Record at 48, 53-54.) The cable television industry is in 
its infancy and thus has relatively few potential customers spread 
over a market area of the continental United States, Alaska and 
Hawaii. (Transcript at 23.) 
On or about May 15, 1978, Appellant employed Respondent 
(Transcript at 22, 38, Exh. 9; Record at 53-54) who worked as 
Appellant's sales coordinator and Appellant's national sales manager 
for the cable television market. (Transcript at 22, 38, 40.) In 
her work, she became knowledgeable and familiar with Appellant's 
products, sales methods and customers. (Transcript at 15-18, 22-23, 
25-28, 38, 44.) • Respondent also was involved in the operational 
design specifications and technical development of Appellant's 
multi-channel character generator and other products and had access 
to proprietary information. (Transcript at 15-18, 39-40, Exh. 10; 
Record at 48.) Respondent also became the recipient and object of 
Appellant's good will through her interaction with Appellant's 
customers (Transcript at 25-27) and as a result of extensive promo-
tional activities and advertising by Appellant designed to create 
good will in or though Respondent so that she could be more effec-
tive in the sale of Appellant's products. (Transcript at 27-28, 46, 
Exh. 13.). 
In order to protect its good will and to prevent com-
-2-
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petitors from acquiring, appropriating or discovering the distinc-
tive characteristics and design features of Appellant's products and 
to maintain and protect Appellant's competitive advantage of its 
products in the industry (Record at 48), Appellant requires all 
employees, in connection with their employment, to sign a 
proprietary information and restrictive employment agreement. 
(Transcript at 11-13.) • After commencing employment on May 15, 
1978, Respondent signed such an agreement on January 11, 1979 
(hereinafter "Agreement"). (Exh. 9; Transcript at 12-13, 38; Record 
at 48, 53-54.) Respondent's employment was terminable at the will 
of either party, and she executed the Agreement in consideration of 
continued employment with Appellant. At approximately the same 
time, Respondent also received a promotion and raise. (Transcript 
at 42-43, Exh. 12.) The lower Court specifically found that there 
existed adequate compensation and consideration for Respondent's 
execution of the Agreement. (Transcript at 43-44.) 
Respondent's Agreement prohibits her from disclosing 
proprietary and confidential information concerning Appellant's pro-
ducts and marketing programs and from rendering services to any com-
petitior ("Conflicting Organization" in the Agreement) within two 
years fro~ the date of termination of employment with Appellant, 
except under certain conditions which have not been met in this case. 
(Record at 53-54 ~) Respondent's Agreement further provides that 
in the event of breach of its terms and conditions by Respondent, 
Appellant's rights under the Agreement can be enforced by injunc-
tion. (Transcript at 37, Exh. 9.) 
During March of 1981, Respondent voluntarily terminated her 
-3-
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employment with Appellant and, notwithstanding the Agreement, became 
and is employed by MetroData as its national sales manager. 
(Transcript at 29; Record at 48, 53-54.) In such position she is 
able to (Transcript at 44-45) and has competed for Appellant's 
customers on behalf of MetroData and unfairly deprived Appellant of 
the benefit of its good will created in or through Respondent and 
also of the results of its time, effort and expense incurred in 
developing, manufacturing and selling its products. (Transcript at 
29.) 
Following Respondent's employment at MetroData, Appellant 
commenced this action against both Respondent and MetroData in an 
effort to restrain such employment relationship and to recover such 
damages as it had incurred and would incur as a result of breach of 
the Agreement by Respondent and interference with the Agreement by 
MetroData. (Record at 2-10.) Subsequent to denial of the prelimi-
nary injunction, Defendant MetroData moved for and obtained 
dismissal of the action as against it on the basis of lack of juris-
diction in Utah. Appellant has not appealed that order, and litiga-
tion with Metrodata is in process in the State of California. 
Appellant initially obtained a temporary restraining order 
against Respondent's employment with MetroData, which temporary 
restraining order was continued for a second ten day period because 
Appellant was unable to affect service of process upon Respondent. 
(Record at 12-20.) Such extension expir~d prior to obtaining service 
of process, however, and Appellant then moved the lower court for a 
preliminary injunction after service of process was obtained. 
(Record at 29-30.) After a hearing on Appellant's motion for a pre-
-4-
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liminary injunction, at which Appellant was allowed but one hour and 
fifteen minutes to present its evidence and argument, the lower 
court denied Appellant's motion and entered the Order appealed from. 
(Record at 58.) The lower court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law are contained in the Record at 53-54. 
Upon petition of Appellant (Record at 60-75) and Answer of 
Respondent (Record at 76-79), this Court granted Appellant's peti-
tion for interlocutory appeal of the lower court's Order on November 
13, 1981. (Record at 59.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IN THIS ACTION IS PROPERLY ENFORCEABLE 
BY EQUITABLE-INJUNCTIVE RELIEF. 
Whila there are other cases supporting such proposition, 
Allen v. ~ Park Pharmacy, 120 u. 2d 608, 237 P.2d 823 (1951) 
(hereinafter "~ Park"), is the leading and most often cited Utah 
case holding that a restrictive employment covenant is valid and 
enforceable when: (1) it is supported by consideration, (2) no bad 
faith is shown in the negotiation of the contract, (3) the covenant 
is necessary to protect the good will of the employer and (4) it is 
reasonable in its restrictions as to time and area. Id. at 828. The 
covenant at issue meets all of these requirements. 
In~ Park, the plaintiff, a pharmacist, became employea 
by defendant and sometime thereafter, executed a restrictive 
employment contract. In the contract plaintiff agreed that, upon 
termination of his employment, he would not compete with defendant 
as an employee or principal in the operation of a drug store or 
pharmacy, within a radius of two miles of defendant's drug store for 
-5-
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a period of five years after termination of employment. While the 
plaintiff evidently did not acquire trade secrets during his 
employment, the case noted that he had created a great deal of good 
will for the employer's business. Id. at 824-27. 
Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action to deter-
mine the validity of the res tr icti ve covenant. Notwithstanding 
defendant's arguments of lack of consideration and mutuality due to 
the terminable nature of the employment contract, and of inequity 
and hardship, this Court held that the contract was supported by 
consideration. This Court also determined that the employer, when it 
hired the employee, also purchased the good will accruing to the 
business by reason of the employee's personal attributes; therefore, 
the employer was entitled to protect such interest by prohibiting 
the employee, by covenant, from soliciting or enticing away custo-
mers or otherwise competing with the employer. The following quota-
tions clarify and lend understanding to this Court's holding. 
Thus, in this jurisdiction, we believe that as long as 
the restrictions as to time and space are reasonably 
necessary to the protection of the business and the 
hardship features of the case do not constitute equit-
able grounds for rescission, or call for the interven-
tion of other rules of equitable relief, then the court 
is powerless to relieve a party from the effects of his 
contract. 
Restrictive covenants are generally upheld by the 
courts where they are necessary for the protection of 
the business for the benefit of which the covenant was 
made and no greater restraint is imposed than is reason-
ably necessary to secure such protection. [Citations 
omitted] 
Id. at 826. 
If there is legal consideration given to support it, an 
employer is equally entitled to the good will created 
-6-
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by his employee, as is the purchaser of an establishment 
which includes the good will of the business. In both 
cases, when the individual responsible for creating the 
good will and the business to which it attaches, become 
separated, it is necessary to preserve that good will 
to the business by a covenant on the part of the indivi-
dual that he will not compete in an area where his per-
sonal reputation will detach the old customers from the 
old business. We hold that a covenant is valid which 
protects good will as well as trade secrets • 
••• Therefore, we hold that a covenant not to compete 
is necessary for the protection of the good will of the 
business when it is shown that although the employee 
learns no trade secrets, he may likely draw away custo-
mers from his former employer, if he were permitted to 
compete nearby. 
Id. at 827. 
The majority opinion in Rose Park acknowledged that if the 
employer had exercised bad faith in connection with the covenant, 
intending employment to last merely long enough to bind the employee 
to the covenant and prevent him from working elsewhere, the covenant 
would not be enforceable. No such bad faith was found, however, 
despite the fact that the employee had been terminated by the 
employer. 
This Court also found the Rose Park covenant reasonable 
----
based upon Defendant's marketing area and upheld the trial court's 
finding as to reasonableness of a five year time duration of the 
restrictive covenant. 
The ~ Park case was cited and followed by this Court in 
Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 v. 155, 239 P.2d 745 (1952) in upholding an 
injunction enforcing a lawful, necessary covenant not to compete, 
on the grounds that such covenant and its means of enforcement by 
injunction were agreed to in a bona fide.contract. 
As reflected in the above statement of facts, Appellant and 
-7-
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Respondent entered into a continuing employment agreement supported 
by the same consideration as the employment agreement in ~ Park. 
The trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law 
in this case clearly indicate that he followed the dissent and not 
the binding law of the majority in ~Park when he concluded that 
the contract in question was one of adhesion working a hardship upon 
Respondent. Nevertheless, the dissent in~ Park is not good or 
binding law, and the law announced and established by the majority 
opinion is applicable subject only to: (1) the agreement being sup-
ported by consideration, (2) there being no bad faith on Appellant's 
part, (3) the restrictive covenant being necessary to protect the 
good will of Appellant and (4) the covenant being reasonable with 
respect to time and area. Each of these conditions have been 
satisfied in the manner necessary to uphold the restrictive 
employment contract in this case. 
Not even the trial court had any problem with there being 
adequate consideration for the restrictive employment contract in 
that it specifically found the existance of adequate consideration 
(Transcript at 43-44). 
Neither is there any showing of bad faith in this case when 
Respondent worked for Appellant for approximately three years and 
then herself voluntarily terminated her employment to work for 
MetroData. 
The Agreement specifically states that Respondent agreed 
not to become employed by a competitor, a "Conflicting 
Organization." MetroData, by the uncontroverted testimony in the 
lower Court (Transcript at 29-30), is a competitor of Appellant and 
-8-
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therefore a Conflicting Organization under the Agreement. Such 
restrictive employment agreement is necessary and designed to secure 
to the employer the benefit of the good will Appellant has 
purchased, created and developed in or through Respondent during the 
period of her employment. 
Through extensive promotions, advertisements and methods of 
business, Appellant not only allowed development of but freely 
sought to develop and create good will through Respondent. 
Appellant displayed Respondent's name and picture as its national 
sales representative in advertisements of its products (Exh. 13), 
which were specifically designed to project Appellant's good will 
and the reputation of its products through Respondent. Under the 
majority opinion in Rose Park, Appellant is entitled to retain, pro-
tect, and preserve the benefits of that good will and reputation and 
not to have the same transferred to Metrooata because Respondent is 
now employed by it and to be protected against Respondent and 
Metrooata using such good will and reputation to Appellant's detri-
ment in competition with it. 
Furthermore, in this case, in addition to Appellant's good 
will which should be protected by the relief sought here, there is 
the distinct possibility of misappropriation and use of Appellant's 
proprietary information by Respondent. Respondent has admitted 
access to Appellant's proprietary information and involvement with 
the operational design specifications and technical development of 
Appellant's multi-channel character generator because of her 
knowledge of customer needs. (Transcript at 44-45) • Due to the 
nature of her employment with Appellant, she was constantly exposed 
-9-
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to Appellant's sales leads, clientele and marketing data and 
programs. These are Appellant's property which Respondent agreed to 
protect and which should be and can only be protected by the injunc-
tion sought in this case. Restatement 2d Agency §§ 395, 396 (1958). 
Finally, the covenant at issue is reasonable as to time and 
area under the standards set forth in ~ Park. Testimony below 
establishes that due to the nature of the cable television industry, 
Appellant's market is nationwide (Transcript at 23). This is also 
evidenced by Respondent's work for both Appellant and MetroData as 
"national sales manager". The covenant is also reasonable as to 
time. Respondent was with Appellant and developing such good will 
for a period of three years, and two years to consolidate such good 
will and develop it in Respondent's replacement is reasonable. 
II. APPELLANT HAS MET ITS BURDEN FOR THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
SOUGHT. 
Those grounds upon which injunctive relief may be granted 
by Utah courts are as follows: 
(e) Grounds for Injunction. An injunction may be 
granted: 
(1) When it appears by the pleadings on file 
that a party is entitled to the relief demanded, 
and such relief, or any part thereof consists in 
restraining the commission or continuance of some 
act complained of, either for a limited period or 
perpetually~ 
(2) When it appears from the pleadings or by 
affidavit that the commission or continuance of some 
act during the litigation would produce great or ir-
repairable injury to the party seeking injunctive 
relief; 
(3) When it appears during the litigation that 
either party is doing or threatens, or is about to 
do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some 
-10-
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act in violation of the rights of another party re-
specting the subject matter of the action, and ten-
ding to render the judgment ineffectual; 
(4) In all other cases where an injunction 
would be proper in equity. 
U.R.C.P. 65A(e). 
With respect to the first ground for injunctive relief that 
it must appear that the moving party is entitled to the relief 
demanded, it is not necessary that the moving party's right appear 
absolutely certain. It is enough that a probable right is shown. 
7-Pt. 2 Moore's Federal Practice ,65.04[1] at 65-39, ,65.04[4] at 
65-67 (1980). The reasons for such lesser showing are, inter alia, 
that unless a full, final hearing on the merits is held on the 
request for a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff may hold back evi-
dence at the hearing for preliminary injunction, or have a case 
which may not yet be fully developed. Moore's Federal Practice, 
supra, ,65.04[4] at 65-67. Also, as was particularly the case in 
this matter (Supra at P. 4 and Transcript 4), time constraints on a 
hearing on a motion for preliminary injunction may preclude a full, 
final hearing on the merits. 
In order to protect one against whom a preliminary injunc-
tion is granted, security is required of the party in favor of whom 
the injunction is granted. 
(c) Security. Except as otherwise provided by 
law, no restraining order or preliminary injunction 
shall issue except upon the giving of security by 
the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, 
for the payment of such costs and damages as may be 
incurred or suffered by any party who is found to 
have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. 
U. R. C. P. 6 SA ( c) • 
-11-
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Not only is Appellant entitled to protection through 
injunctive relief, but it is entitled to be protected in the form of 
a preliminary injunction pending a final trial on the merits because 
each of the three specific listed grounds for injunctive relief in 
U.R.C.P. 65A{e), supra, have been satisfied. 
First, Appellant has requested relief restraining the con-
tinuance of Respondent's employment with MetroData, and Appellant 
has shown probable entitlement to its requested relief at the 
hearing on the motion for the preliminary injunction. Appellant 
obviously did not have time to introduce all of its currently 
available evidence in the one hour and fifteen minute hearing, and, 
in fact, does not yet have all its evidence because its case is not 
fully developed. No formal discovery has yet occurred. 
Nevertheless, Appellant did show, based upon the Agreement and the 
law above discussed, that success is probable, which is sufficient. 
If not restrained, the employment relationship between 
Respondent and MetroData will continue during the pendency of this 
action, and Respondent, as national sales manager for Appellant's 
direct competitor, will be allowed to use Appellant's good will that 
has attached to her and Appellant's proprietary information to 
Appellant's detriment. This satisfies the second stated ground for 
injunctive relief that continuance of some act during the litigation 
would produce great or irreparable injury. It is obviously of great 
intangible injury to have good will created by the time, expense and 
effort of one party used in competition against that party. Also, 
because of the difficulties and speculation involved in proving that 
any sale made by Respondent to a former customer of Appellant during 
-12-
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the pendency of this action would otherwise have been obtained by 
Appellant rather than MetroData, Appellant will have great dif-
ficulty in proving and therefore being compensated for monetary 
damages incurred as a result of a preliminary injunction not being 
in effect. 
The third stated ground for injunctive relief, that an act 
is threatened or is occurring which will tend to render a final 
judgment ineffectual, is likewise satisfied. Any final judgment 
would not be able to effectively restore to Appellant the benefits 
of its good will attached to Respondent or proprietary information 
of Appellant used against and in competition with Appellant during 
the pendency of the action. 
In addition to Appellant having satisfied the requirements 
for injunctive relief under the applicable Rule, it must be noted 
that Respondent has specifically agreed and acknowledged in the 
Agreement that injunctive relief is appropriate and may be awarded. 
(Exh. 9). 
Perhaps of most importance from a procedural standpoint, 
any injury which may be suffered by Respondent as a result of a pre-
liminary injunction can be provided for through the requirement that 
security be posted by Appellant. Appellant has been and is willing 
to provide such security in an amount to be reasonably set by the 
court. However, if it is later determined that Appellant is 
entitled to relief, damages suffered by it during the pendency of 
the action, which in all probability cannot be monetarily proven, 
will be lost without protection to Appellant. 
-13-
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III. THE TRIAL COURTS ,FINDINGS OF FACT AND THE RECORD EVIDENCE DO 
NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OR ORDER. 
The first conclusion of the trial court is stated thus: 
1. Issuance of a preliminary injunction at 
this time would prohibit defendant Dixon from any 
employment within the industry in which she is 
trained, thus creating great hardship for defendant 
Dixon. (Recorded at 54). 
The findings of the trial court do not specify "the 
industry in which [Defendant Dixon] is trained." It may be assumed 
such is the sales industry and, if so, the restrictive covenant at 
issue certainly does not prohibit Respondent's working in the sales 
industry. 
Even if the trial court's findings imply that the industry 
referred to is television equipment sales, the covenant at issue 
does not prohibit Respondent's selling television equipment. All 
the covenant does is prohibit Respondent from rendering services to 
a Conflicting Organization dealing in products, processes or ser-
vices which resemble or compete with products, processes, or ser-
vices of Appellant upon or with which Respondent directly or 
indirectly worked or about which she acquired confidential infor-
mation. (Exh. 9). The agreement also states in Paragraph 6 that 
under certain circumstances Respondent can work for a Conflicting 
Organization. There are no findings, testimony or other evidence to 
support the breadth of the stated restriction on Respondent's 
employment. 
Consequently, the restrictive covenant works no great 
hardship on Respondent; likewise there are no findings, evidence or 
testimony in the record showing any hardship for Respondent. 
-14-
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The second of the trial court's conclusions is stated thus: 
2. The contract is a contract of adhesion and 
because enforcement of it would create substantial 
hardship to defendant Dixon, plaintiff is not en-
titled to the equitable remedy of a preliminary in-
junction. (Record at 54). 
Plaintiff again submits that there is nothing in the record 
to support the conclusion of substantial hardship to Respondent. 
Neither are there findings of fact, testimony or evidence to support 
the conclusion of a contract of adhesion. To the contrary, the 
record indicates that Respondent's employment with Appellant was 
always terminable at will, and the consideration for the Agreement 
was Respondent's continued employment, promotion and raise. The 
trial judge specifically found such to be adequate consideration. 
(Transcript at 43-44.) Furthermore, no bad faith within the purview 
of Rose Park was found: Respondent worked for Appellant for three 
years and then voluntarily terminated her employment. Absent such 
bad faith, such covenants have been enforced because they have 
reasonable commercial purpose in protecting business good will and 
proprietary information and do not, absent bad faith, work 
hardship. 
The third conclusion of the trial court is stated thus: 
3. Plaintiff has failed to meet the standards 
of Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
governing issuance of a preliminary injunction. 
(Recorded at 54) • 
The standards of Rule 65A are not dealt with at all in the 
findings. For the reasons set forth in Section II of this Argument 
based on the record evidence, Plaintiff has met the standards 
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necessary to war ran~ this Court's reversal of the lower court's 
denial of a preliminary injuction. 
CONCLUSION 
Enforcement by injunction of restrictive employee covenants 
such as the one sought to be enforced here has previously been 
allowed by this Court. The instant covenant is . supported by 
consideration; no bad faith has been shown in its negotiation; the 
covenant is necessary to protect the good will of Appellant's busi-
ness, as well as its proprietary information; and the covenant is 
reasonably restrictive as to time and area in light of Appellant's 
business and marketing area. Therefore, the instant case is 
indistinguishable and fully governed by ~ Park and its progeny. 
As shown by the record evidence, Appellant has met its Rule 
65A(e) burden of establishing grounds for a preliminary injunction. 
Appellant, with time and evidence constraints notwithstanding, has. 
shown probable success on the merits; Appellant, if Respondent's 
employment is allowed to continue, will sufffer great and irre-
parable injury; any final judgment, due to Respondent's unlawful 
competitive employment, cannot restore to Appellant damages 
occassioned by the deprivation of its good will and proprietary 
information. 
The lower court's conclusions of law pursuant to which it 
denied a preliminary injunction are not supported by its findings of 
fact or testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing. 
Therefore, because Respondent can be protected by the 
posting of security from any resulting harm from the entry of a pre-
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liminary injunction and because Appellant cannot likewise be pro-
tected from denial of a preliminary injunction if later shown to be 
entitled to a permanent injunction, the lower Court should be 
reversed and directed to enter a preliminary injunction as requested 
by Appellant. 
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of February, 1982. 
PARSONS & CROWTHER 
CERTIFICATzc::¥~ C (.-
I hereby certify that I mailed, pas~age pre~d, two copies 
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to Ellen Maycock, Kruze, Landa, 
Zimmerman & Maycock, 620 Kearns Building, 136 South Main Stree~'-a 
~3--.YCtfl 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, Attorney for Respondent, this ~day 
of February, 1982. 
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